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ABSTRACT
This paper employs correct-by-construction control synthesis, in
particular controlled invariant set computations, for falsification.
Our hypothesis is that if it is possible to compute a “large enough"
controlled invariant set either for the actual system model or some
simplification of the system model, interesting corner cases for
other control designs can be generated by sampling initial condi-
tions from the boundary of this controlled invariant set. Moreover,
if falsifying trajectories for a given control design can be found
through such sampling, then the controlled invariant set can be used
as a supervisor to ensure safe operation of the control design under
consideration. In addition to interesting initial conditions, which
are mostly related to safety violations in transients, we use solutions
from a dual game, a reachability game for the safety specification, to
find falsifying inputs. We also propose optimization-based heuris-
tics for input generation for cases when the state is outside the
winning set of the dual game. To demonstrate the proposed ideas,
we consider case studies from basic autonomous driving function-
ality, in particular, adaptive cruise control and lane keeping. We
show how the proposed technique can be used to find interesting
falsifying trajectories for classical control designs like proportional
controllers, proportional integral controllers and model predictive
controllers, as well as an open source real-world autonomous driv-
ing package.
1 INTRODUCTION
Formal verification, the process of algorithmically generating cor-
rectness certificates for a design, and falsification, the process of
algorithmically finding trajectories and inputs that lead to a vio-
lation of specifications are important steps before a safety-critical
control system can be deployed [2, 7, 19]. An alternative to these
approaches, when a control design is not available but a plant model
and specifications are available, is to synthesize a controller that, by
construction, guarantees that the specifications are satisfied by the
closed-loop system [14]. The key insight of this paper is to combine
ideas from falsification and control synthesis to evaluate control
designs for safety.
Consider the problem of evaluating a control design for an au-
tonomous vehicle for safety. What would be a meaningful specifi-
cation to run a falsification engine against in this case? The hard
safety constraint – “do not crash!" – is easy to specify but can be
trivially falsified. For instance, if a lead car, with very low speed,
cuts in front of the autonomous car traveling with a relatively high
speed, a crash is unavoidable. To get “interesting” corner cases,
one might constrain the distance at which the lead car cuts in or
the speed the lead car is traveling at when it cuts in. But can we
The first three authors contributed equally.
systematically generate such constraints/assumptions? If a falsi-
fying trajectory is found, can we say anything about existence of
a controller that would be able to steer the vehicle to safety, or is
safety simply an impossible task in this situation?
Motivated by these questions, in this paper we propose to use
controlled invariant sets [4] to generate interesting corner cases
for falsification. By an interesting corner case, we mean initial
conditions from which ensuring safety is hard but not necessarily
impossible. We restrict our attention to piecewise affine control
systems subject to external disturbances (e.g., behavior of the other
cars on the road, road profile) and safety constraints given as unions
of polyhedra. We propose a scheme to sample initial conditions
from the boundary of the invariant set. We also consider the prob-
lem of searching for falsifying disturbances (in addition to initial
conditions). To this effect, we compute the winning set of a dual
game, where control inputs are treated as disturbances and distur-
bances are treated as control, and where the goal is to reach the
unsafe set. The dual strategy obtained by solving the dual game can
be used to generate falsifying inputs when the state is within the
winning set of the dual game. Greedy heuristics that aim to push
the states to the dual game winning set are also proposed.
As an additional advantage, in case a control design is found
unsafe using the proposed method, we can supervise this unsafe
controller with the controlled invariant set in order to guarantee
safety while still using the unsafe controller, which may have fa-
vorable performance related properties [13]. This supervision idea
is similar to the simplex architecture [3, 20], where a performance
controller is used together with a simpler controller that has a certi-
fied safety envelope and that overwrites the performance controller
only when its actions risk safety.
We demonstrate the proposed approach using two autonomous
driving functions: adaptive cruise control and lane keeping. Adap-
tive cruise control aims to regulate the longitudinal dynamics of
a vehicle either to a desired speed or a desired headway to a lead
vehicle. Lane keeping controls the lateral dynamics of a vehicle to
track the center line of the lane. We present safety specifications
for both functions. We then apply the proposed approach to a set
of controllers, including Comma AI software, an open source au-
tonomous driving package, to reveal potential corner cases leading
to specification violation.
2 MAIN INGREDIENTS
Our goal in this paper is to search for interesting corner cases for
falsification of closed-loop control systems. By interesting corner
case, we mean a pair of initial condition and external (disturbance)
input signal that leads to a trajectory violating a given safety speci-
fication, together with a certificate that it is possible to satisfy the
specification for this initial condition and external input; therefore
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Figure 1: Main workflow. Given a systemmodel and a safety
specification we synthesize a controlled invariant set con-
tained inside the safe set and awinning set for the dual game.
Based on these two objects we extract “interesting" initial
conditions and disturbance strategies that are used to evalu-
ate the safety of arbitrary (black-box) controllers.
violation is indeed avoidable. We summarize the proposed frame-
work in Figures 1 and 2 before detailing the different components.
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Figure 2: In the evaluation phase, a (known) system model
is controlled by a (black-box) controller. We discuss two set-
tings, i.e., falsification (left) and supervision (right), for an-
alyzing and enforcing safety of the closed-loop system re-
spectively. In falsification, the outputs of the framework in
Figure 1 are used to guide exploration of initial conditions
(x (i)0 ) and disturbances (d) that lead to safety violations. As
a by-product, a supervisor architecture that enforces invari-
ance by rejecting potentially unsafe inputs (u) can be added
around a controller that is found unsafe in the falsification
step.
2.1 Controlled Invariant Sets
Invariance properties are the most basic safety properties where the
goal is to avoid an unsafe set at all times, and has been widely stud-
ied in the literature [4]. The maximal (robust) controlled invariant
set is the set of all states inside the safe set from which there exists
a controller that can guarantee remaining safe for all future times
(under all possible realizations of uncertainty and disturbances).
Formally, we define a controlled invariant set for a continuous-
time system using a tangent cone. Let S be a set in Rn ; a vector
y ∈ Rn is called a feasible direction of set S at x ∈ S if there
exists ε > 0 such that x + δy ∈ S for all δ ≤ ε . The tangent
cone of a set S at x is then defined to be TS (x) := closure({y |
y is feasible direction of S at x}). Consider a dynamical system de-
scribed by the following differential equation
d
dt x = f (x ,u,d), (1)
where x ∈ X is the state, u ∈ U is the control, and d ∈ D is the
disturbance. Here, X ,U , and D represent the set of possible states,
controls, and disturbances, respectively. Set Sinv ⊆ X is called
controlled invariant under the dynamics in Eq. (1) if [4]
∀x ∈ ∂Sinv : ∃u ∈ U : ∀d ∈ D : f (x ,u,d) ∈ TSinv (x), (2)
where ∂Sinv represents the boundary of set Sinv. Set invariance can
be defined similarly for discrete-time control systems of the form
x(t + 1) = F (x(t),u(t),d(t)) . (3)
A set Sinv is controlled invariant under dynamics in Eq. (3) if
∀x ∈ Sinv : ∃u ∈ U : ∀d ∈ D : F (x ,u,d) ∈ Sinv. (4)
For simple linear system dynamics subject to additive distur-
bance or polytopic uncertainty, it is possible to approximate the
maximal invariant set to an arbitrary precision [6, 18]. In this paper,
we used polytopic invariant sets, as is done in [12, 13, 22]. It is also
possible to compute controlled invariant sets represented via barrier
functions using sum-of-squares optimization [15] or approximate
them via abstraction-based techniques [17]. Invariant set compu-
tation can be seen as a safety game between the control input u
and the disturbance d , where the maximal controlled invariant set
corresponds to the winning set (i.e., the set of all the initial states
from which u can enforce safety irrespective of the values of d) in
the game for the control input.
2.1.1 Supervision. The controlled invariant set can be used to
supervise a legacy controller to avoid violation of the safety con-
straint [13], even when a controller for which a safety violation
is found in the falsification step is used. The idea is to provide a
recursive guarantee on safety by enforcing the trajectory to stay
within a controlled invariant set Sinv contained by the safe set. The
supervisor is a set-valued map P that maps the current state xc to a
set of control inputs P(xc) ⊆ U . Under any control u ∈ P(xc), the
next state stays within set Sinv under all disturbance. The super-
visor overrides the legacy controller in a minimally intrusive way.
That is, the supervisor is active and provides a control input in set
P(xc), whenever the legacy controller gives a control input outside
P(xc) at state xc. As shown in Fig. 2, when the legacy controller’s
input u is in P(xc), we have the supervisor output u¯ = u.
To be specific, the set P(xc) can be constructed in the following
way. Let x(t + 1) = F (x(t),u(t),d(t)) be the discrete-time dynamics.
We define the set
P := {(x ,u) | F (x ,u,d) ∈ Sinv, ∀d ∈ D}. (5)
Given the current state xc, set P(xc) is obtained by fixing the x
component of the points in P to be xc, i.e., P(xc) := {(x ,u) ∈
P | x = xc}. In particular, under the assumption that Sinv is a
polyhedron (or a union of polyhedra, resp.), F is linear in x , u,
d , and D is a polyhedron, then P can also be represented as a
polyhedron (or a union of polyhedra, resp.).
2
Figure 3: Sampling the boundary of a union of polyhedra.
2.2 Sampling of the Boundary
We sample the boundary of the controlled invariant set to obtain
potentially interesting initial conditions. As mentioned before, the
focus in this paper is on controlled invariant sets that can be rep-
resented as a finite union of polyhedra. Figure 3 illustrates the
boundary sampling scheme of a polyhedron-union set. The gray
shaded area is the union of the polyhedra. We assume the union set
is contained within a hyper-rectangular domain, and sample along
the first n−1 dimensions of the domain. These samples corresponds
to the red dots in the figure. Then the red dots are projected onto
the boundary of the invariant set, which are marked by the blue
circles in the figure. In particular, this projection can be done by
the following procedure.
1) We first project each red dot y onto the boundary of each
polyhedron P = {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b} in the collection. To be
specific, we fix the first n − 1 coordinates of points x inside
polyhedron P to be the same as the red dot y. This gives 1
dimensional polyhedron
Py := {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b, xi = yi , i = 1 . . . ,n − 1}. (6)
We then compute the vertex representation of the set Py
using MPT3 [9].
2) The vertices of Py are admitted if they are not in the interior
of other polyhedra.
Remark 1. The proposed sampling scheme can be extended to the
case where the controlled invariant set is represented as the union
of convex sets in form of C = {x ∈ Rn | fj (x) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m}.
Similar to step 1) in the above procedure, set Cy is created as
Cy := {x ∈ Rn | fj (x) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m
xi = yi , i = 1 . . . ,n − 1}. (7)
SetCy is a 1-D interval whose bounds can be computed by solving 1-D
convex optimization problems min{xn | x ∈ Cy } and min{−xn | x ∈
Cy }. Also note that a union of convex sets is not necessarily convex
and may contain holes. Our proposed approach is able to sample the
boundary of the holes as well.
For other types of sets, there is a brief survey in [8] on the
existing approaches to sample the surface of nonconvex polyhedra.
Controlled 
Invariant Set 
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Figure 4: Illustration: objective of the dual game
Other methods for generating (asymptotically) uniform samples on
a polytope’s boundary include the shake-and-bake method [5, 21],
and sweep plane method [11], and these can be used as alternatives
to the approach described above.
2.3 Computing the Falsifying Inputs
2.3.1 Dual Game. A falsifying scenario consists of two parts:
an initial condition and a disturbance input profile. In this part, we
show how to compute a falsifying input profile, through solving the
so called dual game, given that the initial condition is outside the
maximal invariant set. Theoretically, if the initial state is already
outside the maximal invariant set, there exists a disturbance input
profile that steers the trajectory outside the safe set. However, if the
disturbance profile is not selected carefully, it does not necessarily
lead to falsification.
We first define some terminology. Let the system dynamics be
given by Eq. (1), and let Ssafe be the safe set wewant to stay inside for
all time. The invariance game aims at finding the largest controlled
invariant set Sinv ⊆ Ssafe. Figure 4 shows the objective of its dual
game: we want to find set Sdual, and a dual strategy д : Sdual → D,
under which the states starting from Sdual is steered into unsafe set
Sunsafe := (Ssafe)C in finite time, as long as u ∈ U .
We solve the dual game by computing the backwards reachable
set of unsafe set Sunsafe. For linear discrete-time dynamics, assuming
that unsafe set Sunsafe is a polytope, the backwards reachable set can
be computed as a collection of polytopes using the same approach
in [13]. The only difference is that we are now “controlling” the
disturbance d and trying to be robust to the real control action
u ∈ U . To be specific, let the dynamics be
x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Ed(t) + K (8)
where x ∈ X , u ∈ U , d ∈ D are polytopes. We first compute a
sequence of polytopes, starting with P0 = Sunsafe, as follows:
Pi+1 ={(x ,d) ∈ X × D | ∀u ∈ U :
Ax + Bu + Ed + K ∈ Pi } (9)
We then project each polytope Pi onto X space to obtain {P i }, and
the winning set of the dual game is given by
⋃
i P i . To determine
the dual game strategy д at the current state x , we locate x in one of
the projected polytopes P i , and the dual strategy can be generated
by picking д(x) such that (x ,д(x)) ∈ Pi .
When Sunsafe is nonconvex but can be expressed as a union
of polytopes, we compute the backwards reachable set for each
polytope and take the union of the obtained backwards reachable
sets. This gives a conservative, yet sound, winning set for the dual
game. Note that, when the invariant set or the winning set for the
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dual game is computed via such a conservative approach, there
will be a gap between Sinv and Sdual in Fig. 4, corresponding to
a set of initial conditions for which concluding whether they are
“interesting" or not is not possible with the computed sets.
2.3.2 Ellipsoid Method. Note that the dual strategy д is defined
on Sdual and is not applicable everywhere on Ssafe. Thus we need a
complementary strategy дc to generate falsifying inputs for states
x ∈ Ssafe \ Sdual. Next, we propose some heuristics for computing
a complementary strategy. Assume that the safe set is given as a
union of polyhedra Ssafe = ∪iSsafe,i and Csafe denotes the convex-
hull of Ssafe. It is shown in [10] that, for any compact set C , there
exists a unique minimum volume ellipsoid (called LJ-ellipsoid of
C) covering it. Denote the LJ-ellipsoid of Csafe with Esafe, which is
defined as
Esafe = {x ∈ X | [x⊤, 1]Q[x⊤, 1]⊤ ≤ 1,Q > 0}, (10)
where the positive definite matrix Q parametrizing the ellipsoid
can be computed using [16]. Define the level of x ∈ X as
l(Esafe,x) = [x⊤, 1]Q[x⊤, 1]⊤. (11)
It is reasonable to assume that points lying on the higher levels are
closer to the unsafe set; hence, driving the system to higher levels
would force it either to the unsafe set Sunsafe or to the winning set
of the dual game Sdual. With this intuition, complementary strategy
дc : Ssafe \ Sdual → D is defined such that it steers the system to
the highest possible level set at each step:
дc (x)  argmax
d
{l(Esafe,x ′) | x ′ = Ax + Bu + Ed + K}, (12)
where we assume that control input u is known.1
Falsifying inputs are computed using д if the current state x ∈
Sdual, and дc is used otherwise (see Fig. 2). Additionally, we develop
some simple input-generation heuristics tailored for the ACC and
LK functions of autonomous driving. These tailored heuristics will
be presented on the fly in Section 4.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND SPECIFICATIONS
For the case studies we consider two autonomous driving subsys-
tems: adaptive cruise control and lane keeping. An adaptive cruise
controller (ACC) controls the speed of the vehicle to follow a de-
sired speed if there is no car in front, and to follow the lead vehicle
within some safe following distance (headway) if there is a rela-
tively slower lead vehicle in front. A lane keeping (LK) controller
controls the steering of the vehicle to avoid lane departures. There-
fore, adaptive cruise control controls the longitudinal dynamics and
lane keeping control deals with the lateral dynamics. In the rest of
this section, we provide dynamical models used in our examples
and formalize safety specifications for both systems.
1When the invariant set is unbounded, LJ-ellipsoid does not exist. In this case дc
can be computed by computing inputs that steer the state closer to Sdual by directly
minimizing the distance to Sdual though the corresponding optimization problem can
be more complex. Alternatively, if the rays corresponding to unbounded directions
are known, an ellipsoid that is significantly elongated along those directions can be
chosen by bounding those rays at a large enough level.
3.1 Longitudinal and Lateral Dynamics
We use the following model from [13] to describe the longitudinal
dynamics of the vehicle:
d
dt

v
h
vL
 =

1
m (Fw − f0 − f1v − f2v2)
vL −v
aL
 . (13)
The system states consist of the following car velocity v , lead car
velocity vL , and the headway h (i.e., the relative distance between
the lead and following car). Control input Fw represents the net
force acting on the mass of the following car. The lead car accel-
eration aL can be viewed as a disturbance to the system. Finally,
constantsm, f0, f1 and f2 are parameters of the model. The values
of these parameters and the bounds of the variables can be found
in Table 1. In particular, the domain the dynamics are defined on is
XACC := [vmin,vmax] × [hmin,∞) × [vminL ,vmaxL ].
Table 1: Parameter values for the ACC model
Param. Description Value
m car+cargo mass 1462 (kд)
f0 friction/drag term 51 (N )
f1 friction/drag term 1.2567 (Ns/m)
f2 friction/drag term 0.4342 (Ns2/m2)
vmin, vminL minimal car velocity 0 (m/s )
vmax, vmaxL maximal car velocity 25 (m/s )
vdes desired car velocity 20 (m/s )
Fminw,c minimal force, comfort −4305.9 (N )
Fmaxw,c maximal force, comfort 2870.6 (N )
Fminw,p minimal force, physical −11482.5 (N )
Fminw,p minimal force, physical 7176.6 (N )
aminL minimal acceleration −0.97 (m/s2)
amaxL maximal acceleration 0.65 (m/s2)
ωmin minimal time headway 1.7 (s )
hmin minimal headway 4 (m)
The lateral dynamics are described by
d
dt

y
ν
∆Ψ
r
︸︷︷︸
xLK
=

0 1 vN 0
0 −Cα f +Cα rmvN 0
bCα r−aCα f
mvN −vN
0 0 0 1
0 bCα r−aCα fIzvN 0 −
a2Cα f +b2Cα r
IzvN
︸                                                     ︷︷                                                     ︸
ALK

y
ν
∆Ψ
r

+

0
Cα f
m
0
a
Cα f
Iz
︸   ︷︷   ︸
BLK
δf +

0
0
−1
0
 rd ,
(14)
where the states are: lateral deviation from the center of the lane
(y), the lateral velocity (ν ), the yaw-angle deviation in road-fixed
coordinates (∆Ψ), and the yaw rate (r ), respectively. The input δf
is the steering angle of the front wheels, which is limited to lie
within θmins and θmaxs ; and rd is the desired yaw rate, which we
interpret as a time-varying external disturbance and computed
from road curvature by rd = v/R0 where R0 is the (signed) radius
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of the road curvature and v is the vehicle’s longitudinal velocity.
Other parameters includem, the total mass of the vehicle, and a,
b, Cα f , and Cαr , which are vehicle geometry and tire parameters.
All values can be found in Table 2. Accordingly, the domain the
dynamics are defined on isXLK := [−ymax,ymax]×[−νmax,νmax]×
[−∆Ψmax,∆Ψmax] × [−rmax, rmax].
Table 2: Parameter values for the LK model
Param. Description Value
vN nominal velocity 20 (m/s )
m car+cargo mass 1462 (kд)
Iz car moment of inertia 2500 (kдm2)
a vehicle geometry parameter 1.08 (m)
b vehicle geometry parameter 1.62 (m)
Cα f tire parameter 85400 (N /rad )
Cα r tire parameter 90000 (N /rad )
ymax maximum lateral deviation 0.9 (m)
νmax maximum lateral velocity 1 (m/s)
∆Ψmax maximum yaw-angle deviation 0.15 (rad)
rmax maximum yaw rate 0.27 (rad/s)
θmins minimum steering angle −0.26 (rad)
θmaxs maximum steering angle 0.26 (rad)
3.2 Formal Specifications for ACC and LK
For ACC, we focus on the safety aspect of requirement in this work.
The (safety part of) ISO Standard requirements for Adaptive Cruise
Control Systems [1] state:
(1) the control input should stay within specified bounds all the
times.
(2) whenever the lead car is close in the sense that the headway
h < vdesωdes, the time headwayω needs to satisfyω ≥ ωmin
at all times.
We extract the safety part of the above ISO requirement and
express it formally in logic. Define sets
M := {(v,h,vL) | vdes > h/ωdes},
S := {(v,h,vL) | v ≤ h/ωmin,h ≥ hmin},
SU := {Fw | Fminw,c ≤ Fw ≤ Fmaxw,c }.
(15)
Set M is the set of states where the lead car is close, set S is the
safe set of states, and set SU contains the allowable control inputs.
Adding the speed limits encoded by the domain XACC , the overall
specification can be expressed as
(∀t : Fw (t) ∈ SU ) ∧
(
∀t : ((v(t),h(t),vL(t)) ∈ M ) →((v(t),h(t),vL(t)) ∈ S ∩ XACC ) ) . (16)
To check safety in the presence of a close enough lead car, we
assume the states are inM and consider the following safety speci-
fication, denoted by φACC :
(∀t : Fw (t) ∈ SU ) ∧
(
∀t : ((v(t),h(t),vL(t)) ∈ S ∩ XACC ) ) . (17)
In the later falsification experiments, we will consider violations of
different aspects of the specification φACC , that is,
φ1ACC := ∀t : v(t) ≤ h/ωmin,
φ2ACC := ∀t : h(t) ≥ hmin, (18)
φ3ACC := ∀t : h(t) ≥ 0.
These three safety specifications correspond to small time head-
way, small distance headway, and crash, respectively. Note that
specification φ2ACC implies φ
3
ACC as h
min > 0. Here we distinguish
specification φ3ACC from φ
2
ACC because violating φ
3
ACC is consid-
ered to be more severe.
For LK, as mandated by the width of roads in the United States
(approx. 3.8m) and typical car widths (approx. 2m), the specification
states that the car must stay within ymax meters of the center of the
lane, i.e. |y(t)| ≤ ymax. We also require the other states to remain in
the domainXLK as larger values of these states are either physically
less meaningful (e.g., can correspond to the vehicle navigating in
the reverse direction) or violate passenger comfort requirements.
Moreover, the lateral dynamics model we use is valid for relatively
smaller ranges of yaw rate, yaw angle and lateral velocity. With
these requirements, the overall specification for LK, denoted by
φLK , is formally stated as:
∀t :(y(t),ν (t),∆Ψ(t), r (t)) ∈ XLK . (19)
Note that state y being out of bound should be considered to be
a significant safety violation, while the other three states in xLK
being out of bounds leads to a less comfortable ride. Therefore, we
will independently count the violations of the specification below
in the falsification experiments:
φ1LK := ∀t : |y(t)| ≤ ymax. (20)
4 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we evaluate the proposed approach on case stud-
ies with different controllers for adaptive cruise control and lane
keeping.
In what follows, both the wheel force Fw and the steering angle
δf are bounded quantities. Thus, for controllers that cannot handle
such input constraints, we use a saturation function before feeding
their output to the system. The saturation function sat is defined
as follows:
satxx (x) =

x if x ≤ x
x if x < x < x
x if x ≥ x
. (21)
In addition to sampling at the boundary of the invariant set,
we also sample in the interior of the invariant set to generate less
“trickier" initial conditions. These interior points are obtained by
shifting (for ACC) or scaling (for LK) the boundary samples.
4.1 Adaptive Cruise Control Results
We computed a controlled invariant set SACC for the longitudinal
dynamics in (13), and sampled the boundary of this set with the
proposed approach to find falsifying initial conditions. The distur-
bance profile is computed by (i) solving the dual game, (ii) a simple
heuristic that corresponds to the lead car doing a maximum braking,
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or (iii) the lead car trying to achievevdes. We explored the following
three classes of controllers for meeting the ACC requirement.
(1) For the first controller, we performed feedback linearization
followed by pole placement with a hybrid proportional (P)
controller, defined as:
u = f0 + f2v
2 − kP
(
v − min(vdes,h/ωdes)), (22)
where kP is the proportional gain, the min part takes care
of the two different ACC modes and Fw = sat
Fmaxw,c
Fminw,c
(u) given
the input saturations.
(2) We also consider hybrid proportional-integral (PI) controllers
with the following dynamics:
u(t) =f0 + f2v2 − kP
(
v(t) − min(vdes,h(t)/ωdes))
− kI e(t), (23)
e(t) =
t∑
τ=0
(
v(τ ) − min(vdes,h(τ )/ωdes)), (24)
where e(t) is the error state and kI is the integral coefficient.
Similarly, the control input u needs to be saturated to obtain
practical Fw .
(3) We also designed anMPC controller with a linearized discrete-
time model with a sampling period of 0.1s using the follow-
ing formulation:
min
∑T
t=0 ∥v(t) − min(vdes,h(t)/ωdes)∥
s.t. Linearized, time-discretized dynamics of ACC,
Fminw,c ≤ Fw (t) ≤ Fmaxw,c , t = 0, . . . ,T − 1,
vminL ≤ vL(t) ≤ vmaxL , t = 0, . . . ,T ,
vmin ≤ v(t) ≤ vmax, t = 0, . . . ,T ,
0 ≤ h(t), t = 0, . . . ,T .
v(0) = v0,h(t) = h0,vL(t) = vL,0
(25)
where v0, h0, vL,0 are the initial conditions and T is the
length of the prediction horizon. Since the objective contains
term min(vdes,h(t)/ωdes), theMPC is hybrid in its nature. To
simplify the computation load, we replace the target velocity
throughout the predicting horizon by min(vdes,h(0)/ωdes),
so that the MPC problem can be solved by a QP solver.
Tables 4-7 summarize the falsification rates for the samples both
from the interior and the boundary of the controlled invariant set
SACC , with disturbance aL profile generated by multiple methods.
It should be noted that the same controlled invariant set SACC
is used to generate initial states to investigate the three different
aspects of the safety specification in Eq. (18). This is because set
SACC is synthesized against the overall safety specification in Eq.
(17). Overall, the MPC controller seems better than the naively
designed P controller in terms of safety.
Another key observation is that the falsification rates of the
test cases with interior initial conditions can be higher or lower
than those on the boundary of set SACC , depending on how the
disturbance (i.e., aL ) profile is generated. In particular, the test cases
with interior initial conditions have higher falsification rate than
the boundary cases in Table 4-6, and usually have lower falsification
rate in Table 7. The key difference between Table 4-6 and Table 7 is
that the leading car is usually decelerating (or maintaining speed
constant) in the test cases from Table 4-6, while it is accelerating
under the test cases from Table 7. In what follows we briefly discuss
how this difference affects the falsification rates by the interior
initial conditions and by the boundary ones.
When the lead car is decelerating, the dynamics tend to have a
“steady state” outside the controlled invariant set SACC . This is true
because the lead car’s deceleration shortens the headway h and
hence pushes the state towards the boundary of SACC . In this case,
the falsifications are due to the long term behavior of the dynamics
as a trajectory may eventually leave SACC Since such undesired
behaviors occur in a longer term, starting from the interior of set
SACC may not prevent ultimate falsification.
Moreover, the trajectories initiating from the interior tend to
move to the “trickier" parts of the boundary, where safe actions
are limited, which increases the falsification rate. We next explain
why this is so. First note that a point in the interior of SACC usu-
ally has larger relative headway h and larger lead car velocity v .
Consequently, the target velocity defined by min(vdes,h/ωdes) has
a higher chance to be equal to vdes when starting from the interior.
The controller hence accelerates to achieve vdes and maintains the
velocity there. Now since the lead car velocity vL is low (due to
deceleration or small initial value), such acceleration will eventu-
ally lead to small headway h, which will change the target velocity
from vdes to h/ωdes. At that moment, however, the following car
velocity may be already relatively high. This hence leads to a harder
scenario and increases the chance of falsification, which explains
the result in Table 4-6.
On the contrary, when lead car’s steady state speed is vdes, i.e. it
is mostly accelerating, the dynamics tend to have a “steady state”
inside the set SACC . This is true because the lead car’s acceleration
enlarges headway h and pushes the state towards inside of SACC .
In this case, the falsifications are mainly due to the transient state
of the dynamics because the state will eventually converge to that
steady state inside SACC . By our conjecture, the initial conditions
on the boundary of SACC have higher chances for capturing the fal-
sifications due to transient state. This explains why the falsification
rate in Table 7 agrees with our conjecture.
To summarize, initial conditions on the boundary help identify
safety violations in the transient behavior, whereas input genera-
tion techniques tend to capture safety violations due to persistent
disturbances (i.e., “steady state").
4.2 Lane Keeping Results
Let us denote the state vector [y,ν ,∆Ψ, r ]⊤ in Eq. (14) as xLK . We
computed a controlled invariant set SLK for the lane keeping model
in (14), sampled the boundary of this set with the proposed approach
to find falsifying initial conditions, and use various input generation
methods to generate road profiles. We explored three classes of
controllers for meeting the lane keeping requirement:
(1) A proportional (P) state feedback controller, defined as
u = K⊤P xLK . (26)
Several P controllers are designed by placing the poles in
different locations. The control input δf is obtained by satu-
rating u to account for the practical limit of the actuator, i.e.,
δf = sat
θmaxs
θmins
(u).
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(2) A proportional-integral (PI) controller, defined as
u = K⊤I x˜LK (27)
where x˜LK expands xLK to include an error state e:
d
dt
[
xLK
e
]
=
[
ALK 04×1
[1 0 0 0] 0
] [
xLK
e
]
+
[
BLK
0
]
u . (28)
Several PI controllers are designed by choosing different
pole locations. Similarly, the control input δf is obtained by
saturating u accordingly.
(3) An MPC controller with the following formulation:
min
∑T
t=0 xLK (t)⊤QxLK (t) + u2(t)
s.t. Time-discretized dynamics of LK,
θmins ≤ u(t) ≤ θmaxs , t = 0, . . . ,T − 1
xLK (0) = x0.
(29)
Since the input saturation is accounted for by the constraints
in the MPC formulation, control input δf = u. where x0 is
the initial condition, and Q = diag([1 0 0 0]).
Table 8 summarizes the falsification rates for the above three con-
trollers. The initial conditions are generated by sampling the in-
terior and the boundary of set SLK , and the disturbance profiles
are generated using ellipsoid method plus dual game and using a
heuristic described as follows:
rd =
{
rmind if y(t + τ ) ≥ t(t)
rmaxd if y(t + τ ) < t(t)
, (30)
where τ is the sampling time of the discrete-time system.
Overall, our MPC design seems safer than the PI design, which is
safer than the P controller. Note that none of these designs are tuned
properly, the goal is just to demonstrate how controlled invariant
sets can be used to evaluate different designs.
Table 3: Controllers used in our tests
Controller
(parameters) Notation Parameter
ACC
Proportional
controller
(P gain)
PACC #1 kP = 600
PACC #2 kP = 1800
PACC #3 kP = 4000
PI
controller
(P/I gains)
PIACC #1 kP = 600, kI = 200
PIACC #2 kP = 1800, kI = 400
PIACC #3 kP = 4000, kI = 2000
MPC
(horizon)
MPCACC #1 2
MPCACC #2 8
MPCACC #3 20
LK
State feedback
(poles)
PLK #1 [-0.93; 0.92; 0.9; 0.8]
PLK #2 [-0.6±0.1i; 0.65±0.2i]
PLK #3 [0.003; 0.66±0.34i; 0.4]
State feedback
w/ integral
action (poles)
PILK #1 [-0.93; 0.92; 0.9; 0.8; 0.7]
PILK #2 [-0.6±0.1i; 0.65±0.2i; 0.7]
PILK #3 [0.002; 0.6±0.4i; 0.4; 0.7]
MPC
(horizon)
MPCLK #1 2
MPCLK #2 5
MPCLK #3 20
4.3 Comma AI
Our framework is flexible enough to evaluate any type of controller
as long as their inputs and outputs match the inputs and outputs
of the system models used. We can also directly use the source
code of a controller after developing a proper interface. In this
section, we demonstrate our framework on an open source real-
world autonomous driving package developed by Comma AI, a start-
up working on self-driving car technologies (see https://comma.
ai/). However, since we are just using a simplified model for the
vehicle dynamics, the interface might not accurately reflect the
performance of the software on an actual car. This can be improved
by improving the models and interfaces, but the goal in this section
is to simply show the applicability of the framework on realistic
control software rather than accurately mimicking the performance.
We describe how we interfaced the Comma AI code (commit
5524dc82 at https://github.com/commaai) with our ACC and LK
framework. The Comma AI code is written in Python. We call the
Python code directly from within Matlab by developing appropriate
wrappers for input/output matching as described next.
The ACCmodule of Comma AI outputs two values: gas and brake
commands, each normalized to [0, 1]. We scale these gas and brake
commands by the physical gas and brake limits of average mid-sized
sedans, Fmaxw,p and Fminw,p , respectively. We then clip the scaled gas
and brake commands to the comfort bounds [0, Fmaxw ] and [Fmaxw , 0],
respectively. The sum of the scaled gas and brake commands is
used as the control input to our system.
The LK module of Comma AI requires extra interfacing with our
simulations. Firstly, Comma AI outputs a control betweenu ∈ [−1, 1],
and we assume that these bounds map linearly onto the range of
steering angles [θmins ,θmaxs ]. Secondly, Comma AI takes as input the
road profile, at dRc discretization, for the upcoming 50 m, which is
measured along the tangent line of the current car configuration.
To provide this at time step T ,
(1) We compute a sequence of future road curvature distur-
bances r1:nd (T )  {dt }nt=1(T ), where n ≥ 50 using one of the
input generation methods. To be consistent with prior road
profiles, we fix r1:n−1d (T ) = r2:nd (T − 1) and only compute
rnd (T ) from scratch. In principle, we can compute r1:nd (T )
entirely from scratch; this setting can be interpreted as driv-
ing with Comma AI vision sensor failure/noise, leading to
inconsistent roads from prior time steps. However, by ensur-
ing that we provide consistent roads, we give Comma AI the
advantage here by assuming that the vision data is exact.
(2) Assuming that the r1:nd (T ) trajectory was obtained frommea-
surements taken at a rate of dTc of the vehicle traveling at
vN m/s on the center line, we can estimate the center line in
road-fixed coordinates, R1:nd (T ), by approximating that the
road traces out arcs of angle r iddTc at every time step i . That
is,
Rid (T ) = Ri−1d (T ) +
vN
r id (T )

cos
( r id (T )
vN − π2
)
sin
( r id (T )
vN − π2
)
+ 1
 .
2After we settled on a version of Comma AI to use for this project, newer versions
of the Comma AI code have changed the lane-keeping module from using a PI to an
MPC-based controller. Testing this new controller within our framework is the subject
of future work.
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Figure 5: The output of a diff utility showing the modification in Comma AI. Left: Comma AI*, right: Comma AI.
Table 4: ACC falsification rates (FR), with no input generation, for specifications in Eqs. (17) and (18).
Sampling location Interior Boundary
Controller
Specification
φ1ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC φ
1
ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC
PACC #1 0.41 0.20 0.15 0.41 0.42 0.19 0.14 0.43
PACC #2 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.09 0.26
PACC #3 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.16
PIACC #1 0.60 0.25 0.19 0.60 0.63 0.21 0.15 0.63
PIACC #2 0.49 0.22 0.16 0.49 0.41 0.17 0.11 0.42
PIACC #3 0.42 0.21 0.14 0.42 0.30 0.14 0.10 0.31
MPCACC #1 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.09 0.28
MPCACC #2 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.14
MPCACC #3 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.14
Table 5: ACC falsification rates (FR), with dual game, for specifications in Eqs. (17) and (18).
Sampling location Interior Boundary
Controller
Specification)
φ1ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC φ
1
ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC
PACC #1 1.00 0.88 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.64 1.00
PACC #2 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
PACC #3 0.21 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.08 1.00
PIACC #1 0.95 0.98 0.50 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.55 1.00
PIACC #2 0.66 0.99 0.30 1.00 0.54 0.99 0.23 1.00
PIACC #3 0.55 0.99 0.30 1.00 0.39 0.99 0.21 1.00
MPCACC #1 0.32 0.99 0.10 1.00 0.39 0.99 0.09 1.00
MPCACC #2 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.15
MPCACC #3 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.15
Table 6: ACC falsification rates (FR), with max braking, for specifications in Eqs. (17) and (18).
Sampling location Interior Boundary
Controller
Specification
φ1ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC φ
1
ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC
PACC #1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PACC #2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PACC #3 0.25 1.00 0.15 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.13 1.00
PIACC #1 0.95 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.72 1.00
PIACC #2 0.66 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.32 1.00
PIACC #3 0.58 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.29 1.00
MPCACC #1 0.32 1.00 0.22 1.00 0.39 1.00 0.17 1.00
MPCACC #2 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.23
MPCACC #3 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.25 0.28 0.15 0.13 0.29
(3) Since Rd is relative to a road-fixed coordinate system, we
rotate and translate Rd into the car frame by rotating each
waypoint by −∆Ψ and translating by −y (denoted R′d (T )).
(4) We evaluate R′d (T ) values at a discretization of 1 m along
the tangent line using linear interpolation.
Additionally, we modified one of the vehicle model equations
in the original Comma AI code (see Figure 5). We will refer to the
original Comma AI code as Comma AI*, and to our modified code as
Comma AI, which performs better with our interface.
Figures 7 and 8 show a trajectory generated by Comma AI and
Comma AI*, respectively, that leaves the lane boundaries, overlaid
by the trajectory generated by Comma AI and Comma AI* when
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Table 7: ACC falsification rates (FR), with lead car converging to vdes, for specifications in Eqs. (17) and (18).
Sampling location Interior Boundary
Controller
Specification
φ1ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC φ
1
ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC
PACC #1 0.29 0.09 0.06 0.29 0.41 0.11 0.06 0.41
PACC #2 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.06 0.04 0.24
PACC #3 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.12
PIACC #1 0.58 0.08 0.05 0.58 0.66 0.09 0.05 0.67
PIACC #2 0.52 0.07 0.04 0.52 0.48 0.06 0.03 0.48
PIACC #3 0.45 0.06 0.03 0.45 0.35 0.05 0.03 0.36
MPCACC #1 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.20
MPCACC #2 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11
MPCACC #3 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.11
Table 8: LK falsification rates (FR), with input generation, for specifications in Eqs. (20) and (19).
No input generation Heuristics by Eq. (30) Ellipsoid method + dual game
Sampling location Interior Boundary Interior Boundary Interior Boundary
Controller
Specification
φ1LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK
PLK #1 0.22 0.45 0.58 0.81 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PLK #2 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
PLK #3 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.94 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
PILK #1 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.65 0.63 0.91
PILK #2 0.00 0.99 0.03 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.26 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.15 1.00
PILK #3 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.99 0.10 1.00
MPCLK #1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
MPCLK #2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
MPCLK #3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.44 0.002 0.11 0.01 0.44
Table 9: ACC falsification rates (FR): Comma AI, for specifications in Eqs. (17) and (18).
Sampling location Interior Boundary
Input generation
Specification
φ1ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC φ
1
ACC φ
2
ACC φ
3
ACC φACC
No input generation 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.42 0.04 0.00 0.44
Heuristic (max brake) 0.15 0.29 0.00 0.29 0.39 0.43 0.00 0.48
Ellipsoid method + dual game 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.29 0.36 0.19 0.00 0.48
aLead = K(vLead -v_des) 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.56
Table 10: LK falsification rates (FR): Comma AI & Comma AI* (without modification), for specifications in Eqs. (20) and (19).
Comma AI Comma AI* (without modification)
Sampling location Interior Boundary Interior Boundary
Input generation
Specifcation
φ1LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK φ
1
LK φLK
No input generation 0.002 0.868 0.034 0.968 0 1 0.014 1
Heuristic by Eq. (30) 0.000 0.880 0.014 0.982 0.272 0.956 0.264 0.996
Ellipsoid method + dual game 0.006 0.952 0.038 0.994 1 1 1 1
they are used as the legacy controller when the invariant set based
supervisor is active.
We see that for ACC, Comma AI manages to stay out of crashes
for all initial conditions and input generation method; however,
it violates time and distance headways many times, as Table 9
suggests. These violations are undesirable since the passengers
might feel uncomfortable when Comma AI follows the lead car too
closely. Furthermore, the Comma AI code itself sets a soft constraint
for the desired distance headway being greater than 4m, which is
frequently violated.
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Figure 6: Un/supervised ACC trajectories using Comma AI
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Figure 7: Un/supervised LK trajectories using Comma AI
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Figure 8: Un/supervised LK trajectories using Comma AI*
The LK statistics in the left half of Tables 10 indicate that while
Comma AI stays within the lane boundaries for the most part when
starting from nonzero initial conditions, in the process of stabiliza-
tion, it tends to violate comfort bounds. Falsification is more likely
starting from initial conditions in the boundary than in the interior.
Comma AI* (see the right half of Table 10) drives slightly better
on straight roads but performs much worse with input generation
compared to Comma AI, which is consistent with the decent perfor-
mance of Comma AI* on simple roads. The ellipsoid + dual game
method of input generation seems to falsify Comma AI and Comma
AI*more than the heuristic method; in fact, a straight road tends to
falsify Comma AI and Comma AI* more than the heuristic method.
This happens because the heuristic method tends to smooth out the
natural overshoot that Comma AI and Comma AI* exhibit in their
responses.
4.4 S-TaLiRo Results
For comparison and benchmarking purposes, we use S-TaLiRo, a
falsification tool that is proposed in [2], to find falsifying initial
conditions and disturbance trajectories. Although S-TaLiRo and
our approach are somewhat complementary, we try to demonstrate
some of the differences. First, note that S-TaLiRo does not provide
any information about whether a falsifying initial condition dis-
turbance pair is “interesting", so it is not known if the violation is
due to poor performance of the controller or it is unavoidable. To
demonstrate to what extent S-TaLiRo can find “interesting" falsi-
fying trajectories, we use the ACC example. We restrict the initial
conditions that S-TaLiRo can choose by upper-bounding the head-
way h ≤ 200m. Let, X0 := [vmin,vmax] × [hmin, 200] × [vminL ,vmaxL ].
Then, the specification used in S-TaLiRo for falsification is( ((v(0),h(0),vL(0)) ∈ S ∩ X0)∧(∀t : vL(t) ≥ vminL ) ) → φ1ACC ∧ φ2ACC . (31)
In addition, we impose bounds on the external inputs, i.e., aL(t) ∈
[aminL ,amaxL ] for all t ; and the domain of the dynamics is accounted
for by the simulation model. Note that by the assumptions on the
initial conditions and vL in (31), we avoid some of the trivially
unsafe falsifications. To falsify P and PI controllers and Comma AI,
we limit the number of samples S-TaLiRo can try to find a falsi-
fying trajectory to 100; this acts as a timeout condition. We then
run S-TaLiRo for 100 times with the default option of simulated
annealing, a random search method. Table 11 summarizes the re-
sults, showing not all falsifying trajectories found by S-TaLiRo are
“interesting”. Furthermore, S-TaLiRo sometimes fails to falsify P
and PI controllers before our timeout condition, whereas Table 5
shows that the dual game approach always finds inputs that lead
to falsification.
We also provide S-TaLiRo with initial conditions sampled from
the invariant set boundary, therefore forcing it to find “interesting"
initial conditions. These results are reported in the last column
of Table 11. Although S-TaLiRo finds fewer falsifying trajectories
for some controllers in this case, all of the falsifying trajectories
found are “interesting" by definition. Comparing the last column in
Table 11 with that in Tables 5 and 9, we see that our input generation
does better for most controllers except for Comma AI, for which
S-TaLiRo has a slightly higher falsification rate.
Finally, we give S-TaLiRo 111 initial conditions from the win-
ning set of the dual game. S-TaLiRo takes 43secs to falsify all the
points whereas dual game takes 170secs. This is partly due to the
fact that the inputs selected by dual game input generation are
arbitrary (within the winning inputs) but not necessarily aggres-
sive, which can be mitigated by including an objective function in
input generation phase. It is also worth mentioning that for these
initial conditions, our approach is guaranteed to find a falsifying
trajectory however S-TaLiRo does not have such a guarantee due
to its random nature.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This paper proposed a simple idea on how to use controlled invari-
ant sets and solutions from a dual game to generate interesting
corner cases that can be used for falsification of safety specifica-
tions. We illustrated the effectiveness of this idea with an extensive
case study on two autonomous driving functions, namely adaptive
cruise control and lane keeping, with various types of controllers,
including an open source autonomous driving package Comma AI.
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Table 11: ACC falsification with S-TaLiRo. The Falsified col-
umn shows the fraction of times S-TaLiRo finds a falsifying
trajectory/initial condition pair for the specification (31) be-
fore timing out. The invariant set column shows the fraction
of times a falsifying pair with an “interesting” initial con-
dition is found among all runs. The last column shows the
falsification rate when S-TaLiRo is given initial conditions
sampled from the boundary of the invariant set.
Controller S-TaLiRo S-TaLiRo with IC’sFalsified In invariant set on Boundary
PACC #1 0.95 0.89 1.00
PACC #2 0.94 0.90 0.72
PACC #3 0.93 0.88 0.69
PIACC #1 0.97 0.91 0.96
PIACC #2 0.97 0.93 0.87
PIACC #3 0.96 0.91 0.89
Comma AI 0.68 0.51 0.58
Our simulations show that we can identify corner cases with syn-
thesis techniques and also supervise existing controllers to avoid
failure in such corner cases.
The proposed approach should not be considered as an alterna-
tive to falsification techniques, as it is limited to safety specifications
and to cases where approximating the maximal invariant set is pos-
sible. Therefore, it requires some knowledge of the system dynamics
although it is agnostic to the controller. Whereas, advanced falsi-
fication engines [2] can handle rich specifications given in signal
temporal logic, and even black-box system models. On the other
hand, we believe our approach can be used to seed falsification en-
gines by applying it to the safety part of a specification, a direction
for future research.
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